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I show how cyclical aggregate shocks can stimulate structural reallocation activities,
w h i c hi nt u r na m p l i f yt h ee f f e c to ft h es h o c k .Ie m p h a s i z et h eLQIRUPDWLRQDO DVSHFWV related to
restructuring activities and their potential interplay with aggregate shocks. Building on work
by Caplin and Leahy (1994), I develop a model in which production units are uncertain about
thevalueofstayinginthemarketandlearnaboutitovertime ina Bayesian fashion. Inaddition
to their own private assessment, they can also learn from observing other units’d e c i s i o n s .
Given that adjusting is costly, each unit has an incentive to delay action and wait for other
playerstoactinordertomakeabetterinformeddecision. Ifdelayismorecostlyinadownturn,
a negative aggregate shock can break the inertia and induce the most pessimistic agents to exit.
The information released by such actions will induce more action, thus generating a burst in
restructuring activities that reinforces the initial effect of the aggregate shock. This process of
information accumulation and revelation offers both a powerful ampli¿cation mechanism of
relatively modest aggregate shocks and a potential explanation of why restructuring tends to
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1
A substantial body of recent empirical work has challenged the traditional neoclassical
view of the business cycle. On one side, the empirical literature on aggregate Àuctuations
has been unsuccessful in identifying impulses that can account for the large variations
in macroeconomic time series over the cycle (Cochrane, 1994). Figure 1 reports Davis-
Haltiwanger’s quarterly data for job creation, job destruction and employment growth for the
period 1972-1988. The prominent features of the ¿gure are the spikes in job destruction, and
the corresponding decrease in employment, that characterize the troughs. The lack of obvious
large impulses points to the importance of identifying DPSOL¿FDWLRQ PHFKDQLVPV that can
explain such spikes. On the other side, the body of work initiated by Blanchard and Diamond
(1990) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), based on the analysis of gross Àows of workers in
and out of unemployment, has suggested that a substantial part of the job destruction that takes
place in a recession is related to reallocation of workers from one production unit to another,
rather than to cyclical Àuctuations in the demand and supply of labor.
2 This observation
suggests a powerful ampli¿cation mechanism: relatively small aggregate shocks could trigger
a process of reallocation activities during a concentrated period that amplify the overall effects
of the initial shock.
4 This is a revised version of the ¿rst chapter of my Ph. D. dissertation, written at Stanford University. Many
thanks to my advisor, Bob Hall, for suggestions and encouragement. I would also like to thank Steve Davis, Mike
Horvath, Chad Jones, Ken Judd, Mike Pries, Tom Sargent, Martin Schneider, Valter Sorana, Daniele Terlizzese,
an anonymous referee and participants in seminars at Stanford University, UWA, University of Chicago, Whar-
ton, the Bank of Italy and the ESEM meeting in Berlin for useful discussions. All remaining errors are my
responsibility. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reÀect those of the Bank of Italy.
Financial support from the Center for Economic Research-Olin Foundation Dissertation Fellowship is
gratefully acknowledged.
Keywords: Aggregate Àuctuations Ampli¿cation Job destruction Strategic learning.
JEL classi¿cation numbers: E32, D83, L16, J65, C73.
5 See Caballero and Hammour (1994) for a model of “creative destruction” along these lines.8
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Shaded regions represent recessions.
Research on the interrelation between aggregate and allocative shocks,
3 a n do nt h e i r
respective roles in generating employment Àuctuations, was initiated by Lilien (1982), who
showed that during recessions the variance of employment growth rates across sectors
increases substantially. Since then, a consensus has emerged that a considerable part of
the employment changes taking place in a recession has a structural rather than a cyclical
character. Identifying the direction of causality has turned out to be a harder task, as argued,
among others, by Loungani (1996): is the reallocation a driving force of aggregate Àuctuations
or is it that the economy takes advantage of the low level of economic activity to carry out
necessary restructuring activities? While this is an important question, an increasing number
of empirical studies using micro data show that reallocating workers from one production
unit to another takes time and resources.
4 This evidence suggests that, even if aggregate
6 I refer to allocative shocks as shocks that change the long-run desired allocation of resources in the econ-
omy, and to aggregate shocks as having only a temporary and symmetric impact on all production units.
7 For example, using data from the Displaced Workers Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Hall (1995) ¿nds that, after losing a long tenure job, a worker is likely to hold a sequence of short-term jobs. The9
shocks were the primary source of aggregate Àuctuations, substantial movements of workers
across production units would have an important impact on the character and magnitude of the
resulting employment Àuctuations.
These observations (and the availability of Census data) have led to a renewed interest in
the role of allocative shocks in determining employment Àuctuations over the business cycle.
5
Although still far from de¿nitive, the main ¿ndings can be summarized as follows:
– Allocative shocks have an important role in driving aggregate employment Àuctuations.
– The reallocation of workers within sectors is at least as important as that across sectors,
even for narrowly de¿ned sectors.
– A large part of job destruction is attributable to plants that reduce employment by 25
percent or more, and the share of such plants increases during recessions.
The characterization of the economy that emerges from this literature is one in which
heterogeneous units with changing desired employment follow nonlinear adjustment policies
that induce large and infrequent downward adjustments, maybe due to the presence of kinked
adjustment costs. It is important then to understand how the timing and the intensity
of reallocation activities interact with aggregate shocks to determine the movements in
employment over the business cycle.
I build a model of endogenous revelation of information to explain the sudden increase
in job destruction that characterizes a recession. I set up an economy in which production is
carried out using different technologies. Production units are divided into cohorts, with all
units in a given cohort sharing the same technology. They are uncertain about the ef¿ciency of
their technology, and consequently about the optimality of remaining in production, and learn
a b o u ti to v e rt i m ei naB a y e s i a nf a s h i o n .
6 Units’ assessments are private information, but they
can observe the decisions of similar units and infer useful information from that. If shutting
loss of income resulting from the displacement, due both to the time spent out of work and to the reduction in
earnings in the new jobs, is estimated to be about 1.2 years of earnings.
8 Recent studies that address these issue are Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997), Campbell and Kut-
tner (1996) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1996).
9 Jovanovic (1982) proposes a model in which ¿rms learn about their ef¿ciency over time. The predictions
of the model are empirically supported by the ¿ndings of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989).10
down is costly, there is an incentive to wait for somebody else to exit in order to make a better
informed decision.
With the right restrictions imposed, the model can be solved along the lines of Caplin
and Leahy’s (1994) model of a multi-stage investment project. The model generates GHOD\ in
adjustments: units tend to postpone costly restructuring activities. In the presence of aggregate
shocks, it turns out that the cost of delaying is lower in booms, so that even production units
that are quite pessimistic about their prospects might ¿nd it preferable to wait on the contrary,
a negative aggregate shock makes delaying more costly, thus prompting the most pessimistic
units to act. Once some agents undertake adjustment, the number of liquidations releases
information that might induce others to shut down. Aggregate shocks therefore trigger a
process of information revelation and actions that speeds up learning and culminates in a large
number of units undertaking adjustment in a short period of time. The role of the shocks is
not con¿ned to reducing overall productivity: rather, they inÀuence the economy mainly by
breaking the inertia that characterizes agents’ behavior.
A number of recent papers have studied the problem of information accumulation and
endogenous revelation in a strategic contest.
7 By studying the connection between aggregate
shocks and exit decision, this paper formally applies the insights of this literature to the
explanation of the business cycle. Technically, the model builds on Caplin and Leahy’s
(1994) model of a multi- stage investment project, from which I borrow the way uncertainty
and strategic learning are formalized, as well as the solution technique. The main technical
difference is the introduction of an aggregate state to account for aggregate shocks. Without
complicating the strategic aspects, I embed the basic model in an environment with entry over
time, which allows me to study the time series properties of the economy and the concentration
effect on exit induced by aggregate shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, and
Section 3 solves for the equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates the role of aggregate shocks in
determining the timing of reallocation activities, while Section 5 investigates the implications
of the interaction between aggregate shocks and reallocative activity. In a simulation exercise,
: For a diverse range of models and applications, see Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch
(1992), Caplin and Leahy (1994,1996), Chamley and Gale (1994), Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode (1997), Rob
(1991).11
I show that the model generates concentration of reallocation activities that ampli¿es the effect
of the aggregate shocks. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
 7KH 0RGHO
2.1 7KH VLQJOH SURGXFWLRQ XQLW SUREOHP
I start by describing the single production unit problem and introduce the strategic
aspects after that. Time is discrete a production unit is uncertain about the ef¿ciency of its
technology and learns about it over time. The unit has to decide whether to remain active or to
exit. In every period the unit receives an idiosyncratic pro¿t realization, drawn from a binary
random variable ~ ' i5}c5 Kj,w i t h5 }:5 K.
8The production unit is one of two types iw,cw j
(“high” and “low”), where the type determines the probability of the realizations of the shock.
A w production unit is more ef¿cient in the sense that it is more likely to experience the good
realization of the idiosyncratic shock:
Pri~ ' 5}mw,j 	 Pri~ ' 5}mwj (1)
At time zero the production unit holds prior beliefs and updates them over time in a
Bayesian fashion according to the realizations of ~. Given that the unit can be only one of
two types, the prior is the probability assigned to being type w,: bf ' Priw ' w,j.G i v e nt h e
discrete nature of the prior distribution, the posterior will also be a discrete distribution: in any
period, the unit’s beliefs are summarized by a value b representing the probability assigned to
the event iw ' w,j.I nf a c t ,g i v e n? }good and ?K bad realizations of the productivity shock,
Bayes rule gives:
9
bE?}c? K(b fPriw ' w,m?}c? K(b fj'
Pri5}mw,j?}Pri5Kmw,j?Kbf
Pri5}mw,j?}Pri5Kmw,j?Kbf n Pri5}mwj?}Pri5Kmwj?KE  bf
 (2)
; For example, the shock could be the realization of the production costs, with cost being inversely propor-
tional to the realizations of ].
< Formally, given a random sample from a Bernoulli distribution with unknown parameter, the family of
priors from the q-values discrete distribution is (trivially) a conjugate family. Note that ] behaves like a Bernoulli
random variable, apart from the fact that the values of the realizations are i}j>} ejrather then i3>4j.12
For a given b, the expected value of pro¿ts is:
ZEb'. E ~ m w , bn. E ~ m w E  b (3)
where, for  ' i,cj,
.E~mw'5 KPri~ ' 5Kmwj n 5}Pri~ ' 5}mwj (4)
Given the assumption that a w, production unit is more likely to receive a bad realization
o ft h es h o c k ,w eh a v e. E ~ m w ,	. E ~ m w  ,s ot h a t_Z*_b 	 f: the expected value of pro¿ts
is decreasing in the probability assigned to being type w,.
Ap r o d u c t i o nu n i ts t a r t sa tt i m ez e r ow i t hap r i o rb f. Future pro¿ts are discounted at
rate q. Upon exit, a unit pays a scrapping cost & or receives a salvage value &
10 exit is an
irreversible decision. The exit cost is intended to capture the degree of labor market Àexibility.
Parameters of the model are selected such that, conditional on types, it is optimal for a low




Standard arguments ensure existence and uniqueness of a solution. At this point, I do not
directly tackle the problem, but note that the solution of similar problems is well known both
in discrete and in continuous time.
11 Beliefs constitute a martingale that evolves according to
the realizations of ~ and the production unit solves an optimal stopping problem the optimal
policy takes the form of a threshold level for beliefs, above which it is optimal to shut down.
43 What is essential is the relative value of n compared to the expected pro¿ts from remaining in the market.
Abusing notation, de¿ne +l, as the expected pro¿t for a unit known to be of type l (so that, for example,
+o,  +4, then, a unit that knows its type will remain in the market if and only if +l,  +4  ,n>l @
io>kj,LH if the expected pro¿ts are at least as large as the Àow revenue coming from exit.
44 See for example the literature on Ss adjustment policies (Bertola and Caballero, 1990) and the parallel
literature on irreversible investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) for the continuous time case, and Sargent (1987)
for the discrete case.13
2.2 7KH DJJUHJDWH VWDWH
In each period the economy can be in one of two states r ' i?c_j,w h e r e?denotes
“normal” and _ d e n o t e s“ d o w n t u r n ” . T h ea g g r e g a t es t a t ei sr e a l i z e da n do b s e r v e dEHIRUH
the production unit makes its decision, so that there is no uncertainty about the state of the
economy in the current period.
12 The aggregate state inÀuences the average productivity by
determining the values that the idiosyncratic shock can take. A downturn lowers both values
of the shock: 5_
 	5 ?
 for  ' i}cKj the probability of each realization is independent of the
aggregate state.
13 As a consequence, the expected pro¿ts are lower in a downturn for all values
of b:
ZEbc? :Z E bc_ (6)
where
ZEbcr'. E ~
rm w , bn. E ~












The aggregate state evolves according to a Markov transition matrix. I use the notation
|Ermr to indicate the probability that | periods ahead the state is r, given that the current
state is r. I assume that it is more likely that the aggregate state will be ? next period if it is ?
today:
E?m? : E ? m _   (7)
45 The emphasis of the model is on idiosyncratic rather than on aggregate uncertainty. Gonzales (1996)
develops a model in which the evolution of the aggregate state is unobservable and agents can costly experiment
to obtain information about it.
46 This assumption makes the pace of learning independent of the aggregate state. An interesting alternative
would be one in which the probabilities of receiving a certain shock also change over the business cycle. For
example, one could argue that a downturn is more effective at discriminating among ef¿cient and inef¿cient
production units and model the probabilities accordingly.14
The introduction of the aggregate state necessitates that the unit’s problem be













?j, above which the unit leaves the market.
2.3 7KH JDPH
Consider now an economy populated by a continuum of units. The problem of the single
unitisidenticaltotheonedescribedintheprevioussection. Imakefourimportantassumptions
about the interaction among units and about their evolution.
ASSUMPTION 1. There is no interaction at the level of payoff: the pro¿ts of one unit do
not depend either on the actions or on the number of other units.
ASSUMPTION 2. Signals are private information: a unit can only observe other units’
actions.
ASSUMPTION 3. The realizations of signals are independent across production units and
over time.
ASSUMPTION 4. In addition to the endogenous exit decision, there is an exogenous
probability of death B.
The ¿rst assumption serves to simplify the analysis, and emphasizes the informational
aspects of the model. While desirable, the endogenization of pro¿ts would make the model
intractable. The second assumption is indeed the critical one, which gives rise to the strategic
behavior of the units: it generates an incentive to observe other units’ actions in order to gain
information from them. The last assumption ensures that the economy will be characterized
by positive entry and exit in the long run.
The economy has an in¿nite number of FRKRUWV. A cohort is the set of units that enter the
market in a given period. Units in a particular cohort share the same technology, but its type
is unknown. Given that all units in a cohort have the same characteristics, each one of them15
can obtain useful information about itself from observing the behavior of the others.
14 In any
period, cohorts are named according to their age. De¿ne %E| as the mass of units of cohort
 that are in the market at the beginning of period |. The mass of units in each cohort in the
market at the beginning of time | is represented by a sequence i%E|j"
'. The total mass of





I assume that the there is an upper bound to the measure of units in the economy, which
is normalized to 1: ;|c xE|  . This is intended to represent the maximum number of
“production sites” available, and deviation from the bound will be interpreted as a measure of
economic slackness.
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si st h ef o l l o w i n g :
1) the aggregate state is revealed and entry of a new cohort takes place
2) exit decisions are made
3) idiosyncratic signals and pro¿ts are realized
4) natural deaths occur.
To complete the description of the environment, the entry process and the strategic
aspects of the exit decision must be introduced.
(QWU\
E n t r yi sm o d e l e di na nDG KRF way: it is assumed that the mass of entering units is a
deterministic function of the difference between the maximum potential measure of the market
and the actual measure of incumbents at the beginning of the period.
15 In each period a fraction
47 The assumption that units that enter the market in a given period are endowed with the same technol-
ogy is used, in a different setting, by the literature studying the relation between technological innovation and
macroeconomic Àuctuations (Campbell, 1997 Caballero and Hammour, 1994). In my context, the essence of the
argument relies on the fact that units share some uncertain characteristics with each other and can therefore learn
from each other. Linking the common element to the period of entry has some empirical appeal and gives rise to
testable restrictions, as will be shown later. The model would work equally well in a setting in which the groups
are not dependent on the period of entry but simply on the technology used.
48 This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity. It would be interesting to extend the model to endog-
enize entry, for example along the lines of Hopenhayn (1992). This possibility is left to future work.16
k 5 Efc of the difference is ¿lled.
16
+E|'kE  xE| (8)
where +E| is the measure of entrants at time | and, therefore, the measure of the cohort of
age zero at | upon entry. Upon entering, a cohort draws a technology from a known binary
distribution. The technology is of type w, with probability bf and type w with probability
E  bf. Another important assumption characterizes the way in which nature selects
technologies.
ASSUMPTION 5. Draws of technologies are independent over time.
This assumption implies that there is no information a unit can get about its type by
considering the types of other cohorts.
([LW GHFLVLRQ
Exit is determined partially exogenously, as a consequence of natural death, and partially
endogenously, as the deliberate choice of incumbent units. The exit choice involves strategic
considerations that are at the heart of the model, given that a unit can learn from the behavior
of units in the same cohort. I concentrate on the informational aspects involved in the process
of discovering types, that is, on how production units learn about their type and how the speed
and timing of learning and reallocation interact with the aggregate state. The extensive form
of the game is the following. At each point in time a KLVWRU\ | 5 M| is a sequence recording
the actions of units currently and previously in the market and the realizations of exogenous
events up to the point when the units must act.
17 The action space after history | for a unit




{stay,exit} if not previously exited
> otherwise 
49 This assumption is motivated by the large body of literature on matching models of the labor market
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), in which it is assumed that in each period a vacancy is ¿lled with a given
probability. This representation of the functioning of the labor market is in accordance with many “stylized
facts” as presented, for example, in Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
4: Given the timing convention, a history contains signals, naturaldeaths andexit decisions up tothe previous
period, and entry and the aggregate states up to the current one.17
Exit constitutes an irreversible decision, and one can think of it as the liquidation of the
unit. Given that units that have exited the market have no further role in the model, in what
follows I will refer only to incumbent players. The LQIRUPDWLRQ SDUWLWLRQ is a partition L of M
whose elements U are the LQIRUPDWLRQ VHWV for player .W h e r e a sMis the complete history of
thegame, U representstheinformationavailabletoplayerwhenmakingadecision. Givenmy
assumptions on the informational structure, the information sets do not contain all the signals,
but only those of player . The per period payoff function is constituted by the expected pro¿ts
if the production unit stays in the market and by an exit cost if the unit decides to shut down:
E@c'

Z E bcr if @ ' stay
& if @ ' exit (9)
where I exploit the fact that Z depends on history only through the current belief and aggregate
state. In case of natural death, it is assumed that the unit pays no exit cost (or gets no scrap
value).
A VWUDWHJ\ for player  is a collection of functions mapping from information sets to
probability distributions over actions. Given that there are only two possible actions, I adopt
the convention that a strategy at | is the probability assigned to action ie%|j G j|
 G L|
 $ dfco.









where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution induced by the
strategy j and by the stochastic evolution of the exogenous variables. The future is discounted
for the possibility of natural death.
 &KDUDFWHUL]LQJ WKH HTXLOLEULXP
The strategic aspects of the model are complex, entailing the solution of an extensive
form game of incomplete information with a continuum of players, who are divided among
an in¿nite number of groups of initially unknown type. However, I show that, by introducing
appropriate restrictions on strategies and on the equilibrium concept, a solution can readily be
identi¿ed. The two fundamental assumptions are that all interaction at the level of payoff has18
been excluded and that cohorts’ types are drawn independently over time. Taken together, they
imply that there is no connection, either direct or at an informational level, among different
cohorts. This suggests that a natural approach to solving the problem is to consider the
evolution of each cohort in isolation and solve the strategic aspects of the game within this
narrower environment. Given that all cohorts face the same problem, once the solution for a
representative cohort has been found, the economy’s evolution can be obtained by applying it
to all cohorts and aggregating over them.
In this section I therefore analyze the behavior of a generic cohort that has entered the
market at time 	 |.Iu s eto indicate the cohort’s tenure:  ' |  	 |. Considering one cohort in
isolation formally translates into focusing on a subset of the history, that is, the one describing
thehistory of cohort  only. Formally, Ide¿ne asub-history 	   
	 |n asa sequence recording
the actions of the units of cohort  and the realization of exogenous events (signals, natural
deaths and aggregate states) pertaining to this cohort up to time 	 | n . Strategies are then
restricted to map from partitions of such sub-histories: an information set for unit  of cohort
 contains the sequences of player ’s signals, of actions by all production units in the cohort
and of exogenous events relating to the cohort’s evolution.
Another restriction relates to the equilibrium concept: I concentrate on 6\PPHWULF 1DVK
(TXLOLEULD, in which units at the same information set choose the same strategy, and de¿ne a
symmetric equilibrium as a strategy jW such that no production unit can increase its expected
payoff by using an alternative strategy 	 j when all other units use jW. The symmetry restriction
implies that the identity of the units taking a given action has no informational content: only
their measure is relevant.
Once these restrictions are introduced, the model can be solved along the lines outlined
by Caplin and Leahy (1994).
18 The assumption that there is a continuum of agents is the
key one. It in fact guarantees that, while the single unit faces uncertainty, at the aggregate
level the distribution of signals, conditional on types, is non-stochastic. As a consequence,
the measure of players at each information set is a deterministic function of the type. This
imposes a very strong restriction on the pace of information revelation: if a strategy prescribes
4; Caplin and Leahy (1994) construct a model of a multi-stage investment project, with the initial measure
of investors determined by a zero expected pro¿t condition. My solution of the game for a given cohort follows
their work closely, differing in the fact that exit is an irreversible decision and that the economy is characterized
by the presence of an aggregate state.19
exit for different measures of units according to their types, then by observing this measure
one can infer the type of the cohort, and uncertainty is immediately resolved. In other words,
the continuum of units assumption implies that the process of information revelation has an
all-or-nothing character. As long as no unit decides to exit, no information can be obtained
by observing actions but if the strategy prescribes exit at a particular information set, then
generally the mass of exiting units will reveal types immediately. I introduce the following
de¿nition to formalize this concept.
DEFINITION 1 . As t r a t e g yi sd e ¿ ned to be type-revealing if for any history 	  there exists
a W at which the strategy induces different measures of exit for the different types.
The de¿nition establishes that, if players follow a type-revealing strategy, then at some
point types will be revealed by the measure of exiting units. Almost any strategy will be type-
revealing. An example of a strategy that is not type-revealing is one that prescribes ¿rst exit
for DOO units (independently of the signals received) at some age .
Consider now the following strategy.
DEFINITION 2. A cutoff strategy is a strategy that, when prescribing exit, does so for all
units with beliefs exceeding a state contingent threshold bEr 5 Efccr ' i ?c_j
A cutoff strategy is characterized by a vector \'i b E ?  cbE_j. For cutoff strategies,
the following result holds.
PROPOSITION 1. Cutoff strategies are type-revealing if bf 	b E r  , s={n,d}.
PROOF see Appendix I.
Proposition 1 establishes that cutoff strategies are type-revealing unless they might
prescribe adjustment only on the basis of prior information, before any signal is realized. For
example, if the strategy prescribes adjustment at any time for bE_ 	b f , all units will exit
simultaneously if at time zero the aggregate state is _ and no information will ever be revealed
about types. In such a case, there is nothing a unit can learn from the others, and the problem
reverts to the one analyzed for the single unit. Outright exit would be an equilibrium if and
only if the prior is beyond the threshold value of the single unit problem. I neglect such cases20
a n dc o n c e n t r a t eo nt h eo n e si nw h i c hu n i t sw i l lb ew i l l i n gt os t a yi nt h em a r k e ta tt h ep r i o r
beliefs for both normal periods and downturns.
19
To determine the equilibrium strategy I concentrate on the problem of an individual unit
with beliefs b, who has to decide her action conditional on being at an information set at which
s h ek n o w st h a tt h et y p ew i l lb er e v e a l e d .T h ep a y o f ff r o me x i ti sg i v e nb yt h ee x i tc o s t :
o E bcr' & (11)
Given that next period the type will be known, the payoff from staying depends on the
continuation value of a unit that ¿nds out that she is a w type in state r. This is the present






dZEwc?E?mrnZE w c_E_mro (12)
For a w unit the expected value of being in the market tomorrow, given the aggregate state r
today, is therefore given by:
T Er' E ?   E ? m r nE _   E _ m r   (13)
T Er plays a fundamental role in determining the equilibrium strategy. It allows us to
determine the payoff from staying, given by the expected pro¿ts for the current period plus
the continuation payoffs:
 oEbcr'Z E bcrnqE  Bdb& nE b  TE r o (14)
Equation (14) states that the payoffs from waiting, given beliefs b and aggregate state r,a r e
equal to the current expected pro¿ts plus the discounted expected continuation values these, in
turn, are determined by the fact that the production unit expects to be type w, with probability
b, in which case she will pay the exit cost and leave, and w with probability Eb,i nw h i c h
case the expected continuation value is T Er as de¿ned in equation (13). The condition for b
4< Note that in a model of endogenous entry, with an entry cost the consistency of such strategies would be
ruled out: entry would not take place to begin with.21
to be such that a production unit would rather shut down is:
oEbcr   oEbcr (15)
Equation (15) can be used to determine the equilibrium strategy. By showing that
 oEbcr is continuously decreasing in b and that there is one and only one value for which
oEbcr' o E bcr, the following proposition, characterizing equilibrium strategies, can be
established.
PROPOSITION 2. Equilibrium strategies are cutoff strategies.
PROOF: see Appendix I.




_j denote the pair of values that satis¿es (15) with equality. \W is
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nqE  BE& n T E_
 (16b)
The characterization of the equilibrium strategy in proposition 2 lets us concentrate
attention on the most pessimistic production units. Given that there exists a continuum of
production units, in each period there will be a nonzero measure of units that has received all
possible combinations of signals. In any period, therefore, the beliefs of the most pessimistic
production units are the beliefs of those that have received all bad signals. One can then
uniquely determine the minimum number of bad signals, and therefore of periods, required for
the beliefs of a subset of units to exceed some b:
Eb  Infi6 5Q nG
Pri5Kmw,j6bf
Pri5Kmw,j6bf n Pri5Kmwj6E  bf
 bj (17)
where Qn is the set of nonnegative integers. It is easy to show that the fraction in (17) is
increasing in 6 so that Eb is uniquely determined. By equation (17) we can associate with
\W av e c t o rAW'i W
?cW
_j, where, abusing notation, I use W
r for Eb
W
r. This vector determines22
the two ¿UVW VWRSSLQJ WLPHV: it indicates the state-contingent minimum number of periods at
which the ¿rst exit wave could take place in equilibrium. Figure 2 plots Eb for b  *2 for
the following parameter values: bf ' * 2 coi~ '5 Kmw ,j'Scoi~ '5 Kmw j'e.N o t e
the discontinuous character of the function Eb.
Figure 2
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I have established the existence of cutoff values for beliefs after which a production unit
would rather exit than wait. For them to be an equilibrium couple it is also necessary that
no production unit would rather exit for less pessimistic beliefs. It could be that a production
unit that is suf¿ciently pessimistic about its type would ¿nd it preferable to shut down before
reaching the threshold. To eliminate this possibility, it is suf¿cient to check that the most
pessimistic production units are willing to continue for all periods preceding the ¿rst exit
time: for any 	Maxi|W
?c| W
_j,f o ra n yr , the value of continuing for the most pessimistic
production units, when the equilibrium strategy prescribes so, must be at least as large as the
cost of leaving the market:
LE\
Wcr & (18)23
The complete expression for this value is rather cumbersome, having to take into account
the expected payoffs for any possible evolution of the game, and its derivation is con¿ned to
Appendix II. Numerical analysis of the game show that existence is indeed a serious issue,
and that an equilibrium fails to exist in many instances. The problem is particularly severe for
some regions of the parameter values. The existence problem is typical in this class of models
with a continuum of agents. I discuss the issue at more length in Appendix II, where I also
point to an additional assumption on the structure of exit costs that would ensure existence for
any possible con¿guration of the model without modifying the equilibrium analysis.
Finally, there could also be multiple equilibria, in the sense of more then one couple of
¿rst stopping times that satisfy the equilibrium conditions. In all the cases computed I found
that aunique equilibriumexists.
20 In case ofmultipleequilibria, a sensible selectionrulewould
be to pick the smallest ¿rst adjustment times A W.
 $JJUHJDWH VKRFNV DQG UHDOORFDWLRQ WLPLQJ
In this section I analyze more closely the implications of the model, concentrating on
the interrelation between aggregate shocks and reallocation activity. We have seen that at the
heart of the model is the incentive for production units to free-ride in terms of production of
information. As a consequence, even production units that have a high con¿dence of being
of type w, might still ¿nd it optimal to delay adjustment, in the hope that others will go ¿rst.
One important question is then how this incentive varies over the business cycle: pessimistic
production units might ¿nd it relatively cheap to postpone restructuring in normal periods,
while this might become more expensive in a downturn. As a consequence, it could be that the
equilibrium pessimism level is lower in a downturn than in a normal period. This is indeed the
case in the model, as established in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. The equilibrium level of pessimism at which it is optimal to exit is






53 Preliminary analytical work indicates that equilibrium is indeed unique.24






PROOF: see Appendix I.
Proposition 2 dictates the following characterization of the evolution of a given cohort:
–f o r	 W
_ , no production unit voluntary exits and, therefore, no private information is
revealed
–f o r W
_	 W
? , production units with beliefs greater than or equal to b
W
_ will choose to
shut down if in any period the economy is in a downturn
–f o r ' W
? ,e x i tw i l lt a k ep l a c ea n y w a y ,i fi th a sn o ta l r e a d yt a k e np l a c ep r e v i o u s l y .
The evolution is graphically represented in the following Figure 3.
Figure 3










The mass of units shutting down during the ¿rst exit wave is small. For example, if the
downturn hits exactly at W
_, then the percentage of units in the cohort that will exit equals
oi5 Kmw,j W
_ if the cohort is w, and oi5 Kmwj W
_ if it is w. This is in fact the probability of
receiving all bad signals conditional on types. For values of W
_ suf¿ciently high, these numbers
are small. However, the exit induced by the downturn has the important effect of revealing
types. If the cohort is w,, then in the following period all units exit, with exit taking place25
independently of the aggregate state.
21 It could well be that the largest share of job destruction
takes place in a period in which the state has reverted to normal. If the exit wave is large,
however, the economy will suffer a recession. A recession is therefore a joint consequence of
cyclical and structural events. The effect of a downturn is primarily that of breaking the inertia
induced by the joint presence of microeconomic (unit level) uncertainty and unrecoverable
costs: it inÀuences the economy mostly through the informational changes that it induces. This
view of aggregate shocks overcomes the dif¿culties of the traditional one, in which the shocks
inÀuence the economy only through their direct effect on productivity, and can reconcile both
theneedforampli¿cation mechanisms andthe extent ofreallocation activitiesthat characterize
recessions. Note that I obtain this result without going as far as the literature on sunspots
(Farmer, 1993), in which aggregate shocks only have a role as coordination devices: in my
model, the shocks do have a concrete informational effect.
It is important to understand what determines the difference between the two threshold




_. The higher this difference, the more likely that the
reallocation activity takes place following a negative aggregate shock. To analyze this point,
I refer to equation (14), which determines the payoffs from waiting at a particular belief and
state, given that some units will exit today. The difference in the threshold values depends
on two elements: the continuation value and current pro¿ts. Lemma 2 in the appendix shows
that E? : E _  , that is, the expected continuation payoff for a w unit is higher in a normal
period than in a downturn. This, together with the assumptions about the structure of the
Markov chain governing the evolution of the aggregate state, implies that if the state today is
?, then the continuation value conditional on being w is higher than if the state is _,t h a ti s
TE ? :TE _  . This means that a mistake (exiting when type w)i sm o r ec o s t l yi nan o r m a l
period, thus increasing the equilibrium level of pessimism in normal times. In the same way,
given that ZEbc_ 	Z E bc? ;b 5 dfco, the lower expected revenue in a downturn makes it
more costly to delay adjustment, thus inducing production units to act sooner.
A larger difference between current expected pro¿ts in the two states, as well as between
continuations, implies a larger {\W. Equation (3’) shows that when a production unit places a
high probability on being type w,, the expected value of its pro¿ts depends in large measure on
54 Recall that by construction it is optimal for a o unit to exit irrespective of the aggregate state. Of course,
this need not be necessarily the case.26
.E~rmw,,a sd e ¿ n e di ne q u a t i o n( 4 ’). The model predicts larger differences in the threshold
beliefs if w, production units experience a large drop of productivity in downturns, that
is if ZEw,c?ZEw ,c_ is large. This feature suggests a characterization of the economy
as a system with heterogeneous production units with different ef¿ciency levels, in which
inef¿cient production units might be able to remain in production in normal periods, but are
more adversely affected by cyclical downturns than ef¿cient ones.
While the threshold levels are important for understanding the functioning of the model,
in terms of describing the evolution of the economy we need to consider the ¿r s te x i tt i m e s
 W
_cW




r, so that all the considerations of the previous paragraph apply to the analysis
of the ¿rst exit times. However, in determining the ¿rst exit time the informativeness of the
signals plays a fundamental role: the more informative the signals, the shorter the time needed
to reach a given threshold of beliefs. Given that the ¿rst exit time is determined by production
units that have received only bad signals, I de¿ne the LQIRUPDWLRQDO FRQWHQW in terms of such
signals:
DEFINITION 3. The informational content of the signals is de¿ned as the difference
between the probability of receiving a bad signal conditional on types:
#  Pri5Kmw,jPri5Kmwj (20)
When # islow, a realization of5K is not much more likely for aw, production unit than for
aw, so thatthe informationalcontentislow. Agivennumberofbadsignals willgeneratemore
pessimistic posterior beliefs the higher #: put differently, a given threshold value for beliefs
will be reached with fewer signals.





induce a higher difference between the two ¿rst exit times when signals are less informative:
Y{A W
Y#
   
{\W
	 f (21)
55 In terms of Figure 2, this means that the steps become longer as  increases.27
Less informative signals therefore imply a higher probability that the reallocation
process occurs after an aggregate downturn.
Finally, we note that an increase in & increases both threshold values. This means that
an economy with higher adjustment costs will be characterized by an average lower turnover
rate. The consequences of this fact reach beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on the
cyclical aspects of production units’ turnover. This would be an interesting direction in which
to extend the analysis.
 7KH FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RI UHDOORFDWLRQ DFWLYLWLHV
After the discussion of the single cohort problem, I revert to the whole economy and
analyze the implications of aggregate downturns for the process of aggregate entry and
exit, which are intended to be proxies for job creation and job destruction. Recall that the
composition of units in the economy at the beginning of time | is represented by a sequence
i%E|j"
',w h e r e% E | isthemassofcohortofageinthemarketattime|. Suchadescription
containsredundantinformation. Fromtheequilibriumcharacterizationitisknownthat, forany
cohort, the type will be revealed at age W
? at the latest, so that cohorts W
? n cW
?n2 c are
of known type. But once the type is revealed, there is no need to keep track of each individual
cohort’s evolution: if the type is w,, all units will exit and will play no further role in the
economy if the type is w, all units will stay until natural death occurs, with the probability
of death being independent of age. We can therefore aggregate all units that are known to be
type w at time | and denote their mass by %wE|. Then, we only need to keep track of the
mass and type of cohorts of age W
? and younger, whose type might still be unknown. A more
parsimonious representation of the market composition is therefore constituted by a EW
? n 
vector fE|'i %  E |  cc%W
?E|(%wE|j. In addition to this vector, I de¿ne another vector
XE|'i w  E |  ccwW
?E|j recording the types of cohorts ccW
?. These variables, together
with the current aggregate state, allow the determination of entry and of both voluntary and
involuntary exit, so that they are suf¿cient to determine the evolution of the economy.
Theaboveeconomyhasanaturalinterpretationintermsofempiricalcounterparts. There
is a mass %wE| of mature units that have found they are w and whose probability of death is
therefore low, and a mass of young units, represented by the vector i%E|j
W
?
',t h a ta r es t i l l28
uncertain about their type and therefore might shut down within a short period of time. I name
the ¿rst group VWDEOH XQLWV and the second group IUDJLOH XQLWV. While it is a crude description
of reality, excluding the possibility of partial expansion and contraction of employment, such
a characterization ¿nds strong empirical support in a number of studies. Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson (1989), using data from the US manufacturing sector for over 200,000 plants in
the 1967-1977 period, show that the variance of the growth rate of plants declines with age.
More importantly, the failure rate also declines with age, with the probability of exiting within
¿ve years of entry being equal to approximately 41 percent. Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode
(1997), in their study of the US beer brewing industry, show that the life-cycle of cohorts
that entered at different points in time is remarkably similar. In particular, the hazard rates
a r ev e r yh i g hi nt h e¿ rst years after entry and tend to stabilize around relatively low values
after that. Similar conclusions are reached by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) in their
study of the relation between plant age and patterns of job creation and destruction. All these
studies point to the description of the life cycle of a unit as characterized by an initial turbulent
phase, in which the unit is learning about its long-term prospects and the probability of exit is
remarkably high, and a mature, more stable phase.
23
Consider now the FRQFHQWUDWLRQ HIIHFW of aggregate shocks. Borrowing the terminology
from Hall (1997), I de¿ne the cohorts within the age interval dW
_cW
?o as YXOQHUDEOH to
aggregate downturns, in the sense that an aggregate downturn will induce type-revealing
actions, potentially inducing exit of such cohorts. If the economy is in a normal period,
then only the cohort of age W
? will undertake an adjustment. If the aggregate state switches
to a downturn, however, all the vulnerable cohorts will have their types revealed. As a
consequence, the following period will on average be characterized by a high mass of units
exiting, thus inducing a concentration of restructuring activities within one period.
To provide a quantitative assessment of the “pooling” of reallocation activities induced
by aggregate downturns, I simulate the model numerically, after having obtained the
56 In the model I have assumed that all units in a given cohort share the same type. This implies that, once
the type is revealed, the cohort will experience either total or null exit. It is easy to reconcile such predictions
with empirical evidence. First, one can think of cohorts in the model as de¿ned for a high frequency (semi-annual
for example), while those de¿ned in the empirical studies are for medium to low frequencies. Horvath, Schivardi
and Woywode (1997), for example, use ¿ve years spans to de¿ne cohorts. Alternatively, an easy modi¿cation
would entail assuming that each cohort is composed of two groups, one o and the other k, with uncertainty
about which group is the high type. In this case, the model would imply that only the o types will exit after
the ¿rst adjustment, thus delivering mortality rates for each cohort similar to those observed in the data. In the
simulations that follow, a similar result is obtained by constructing a multi-sector economy.29
equilibrium ¿r s ta d j u s t m e n tt i m e sf o rt h es e to fp a r a m e t e rv a l u e sr e p o r t e di nT a b l e1 . F o r
these parameters, there exists an equilibrium with ¿rst adjustment times W
? 'Hand W
_ 'e .
One additional problem needs to be tackled: a one-sector economy would depend critically on
the particular realizations of types. For example, a sequence of consecutive high types would
imply that there is no secondary wave of exit after a downturn, given that all cohorts ¿nd out
they are viable. Given that in this paper we are not interested in the variability introduced by
this aspect of the model, but rather in the average evolution of the economy, it is important to
net this effect out. The easiest way to do this is to construct a multi-sector economy, with each
sector identical to the single sector described above but characterized by its own independently
drawn sequence of types. The evolution of the economy is then obtained by averaging over all
the sectors: in this way, as the number of sectors grows, the law of large numbers will ensure
that we will indeed obtain the average path for the endogenous variables.
T h er e s u l t sr e p o r t e di nF i g u r e4a r eb a s e do na ne c o n o m yc o m p r i s i n g5 0s e c t o r s . T o
allow for comparisons, I also construct an economy without an aggregate state. In such an
economy, the equilibrium strategy is described by a single threshold value, which I obtain as a
simple average of the economy with the aggregate state.
Table 1
PARAMETER VALUES
bf k qB Pri5Kmw,j Pri5Kmwj






.93 .3 -.6 -1 .5 .1 .5
The simulation is carried out by ¿xing an initial value for the state variables, generating
a sequence of values for the aggregate state, drawing types of entering cohorts and computing
the corresponding evolution for the economy. I let the model run for 2000 periods to eliminate
the effects of the initial conditions. Figure 4 plots the paths for entry, for exit and for the net
Àow. The aim is to compare the model economy with the real one shown in Figure 1. The
y-axis indicates values as a percentage of the total size of the economy at its full employment
level, where each sector has a total mass of incumbents of measure one.
24
57 Given the high level of stylization of the model, no attempt is made to carry out a more careful calibration
exercise. The aim is rather to asses the capacity of the model to account for some qualitative features of the data.30
Figure 4
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Economy with aggregate state








Economy without aggregate state
Shaded regions represent downturns (not necessarily recessions).
The series in the upper panel of Figure 4 show that the presence of an aggregate state
induces the concentration of reallocation activities within a short period of time. When
the aggregate state switches to a downturn, all the vulnerable cohorts will undertake the
adjustment, so in the following period there will be a spike in exit at the aggregate level,
inducing the spike in job destruction that, as shown in Figure 1, characterizes recessions in
real economies. Note that in the period in which the exit rate reaches its peak the aggregate
state might have reverted to normal: this is the sense in which downturns and recessions are
distinctconceptsinthemodel. Intermsofcomparison, thelowerpanelofthe¿gureshowsthat,
without the concentration effects induced by the switches of the aggregate state, the economy
tends to be characterized by stable Ào w so fe n t r ya n de x i tt h a to f f s e te a c ho t h e r ,w i t h o u tt h e
peaks of the upper panel: without the concentration effects of aggregate shocks, reallocation
activitiesarespreadovertimeandcannotaccountfortheburstinjobdestructioncharacterizing
the series in Figure 1.
The simulations also point to other interesting implications of the model. To explore
these further, I carry out an experiment in which I choose a particular series for the aggregate31
state rather than randomly generating it. The series has an initial long sequence of normal
periods, followed by a combination of downturns and normal periods. The behavior of the
economy in the second phase is reported in Figure 5. First, I stress the cleansing effect of
downturns: a downturn induces a period of intense reallocation activity, during which all
vulnerable units discover their type and act accordingly. This implies that in the next few
periods the mass of vulnerable units will be low.
25 Therefore, a downturn closely following












The next point relates to the LQWHQVLW\ of the effects of a downturn: should exit be higher
when a downturn hits the economy after a prolonged period of expansion? Consider the ¿rst
thirty periods in Figure 5. With no downturns, the economy behaves in a fashion that closely
matches that of the economy without the aggregate state, as the ¿rst 15 periods in the ¿gure
show. The effects of the ¿r s td o w n t u r na r er e p r e s e n t e db yt h e¿ rst spike in exit. I then inÀict a
second downturn 9 periods later. The ¿gure shows that the second recession is indeed deeper
than the ¿rst one, with a higher spike in job destruction. This result is due to the fact that
t h ee x i tw a v ef o l l o w i n gt h e¿ rst downturn induces some periods of high entry as the economy
58 In terms of the state vector [+w,, the revelation of types for all units of age 
g and older implies that at
the end of next period all the cohorts of age 
g .4or more will be empty.32
¿lls up again, so that the cohorts that enter after the recession will be larger than average.
Consequently, after a surge in exit, as the economy ¿lls up again the mass of fragile units
increases the second downturn hits when such large cohorts are vulnerable, thus inducing a
particularly high level of exit.
26 This feature of the model accords with the particular severity
of the 1981-82 recession as illustrated in Figure 1: this recession was in fact preceded by a
short and sharp one at the beginning of 1980. Many observers claim that the recession of
1981-82 was characterized by a high level of restructuring activities. According to the model,
much of such restructuring can be attributed to units that entered during the recovery following
the previous recession.
The previous observation leads to one ¿nal point, which relates aggregate downturns to
the composition of exit. A downturn induces a surge in voluntary exit by fragile units, but
not a change in natural death. This implies that the ratio of fragile to mature units exiting
is noticeably higher than average after a downturn. To make this point clear, Figure 6 plots
the decomposition of the exit Àow of Figure 5. Recessions are induced by a surge in exit
of vulnerable units, with the ratio of voluntary to natural exit going from less then one for
the initial period to approximately four in the period immediately following a downturn. This
observation could be the starting point for the empirical assessment of the model’s predictions.
59 This is also apparent in the echo effects generated by recessions: a prolonged series of normal periods will
induce a surge in exit some periods after the downturn, when the large cohorts that entered immediately after the
recession undertake adjustment.33
Figure 6
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I have studied the effects of aggregate shocks on the level of restructuring activities,
showing how modest aggregate shocks can induce a burst in relocation activities that magnify
the response of the economy to the shock. The model stresses the informational aspects of
restructuring activities. Aggregate shocks trigger an endogenous increase in the amount of
information available to decision makers, which stimulates reallocation. The model offers
both an ampli¿cation mechanism and an explanation of why restructuring activities tend to be
concentrated in recessions.
While the extreme level of stylization leaves room for generalizations, such as
endogenizingentryandstudyingthewelfareimplicationsofthepaceofrestructuringactivities,
it will be essential to assess the empirical validity of the model. This can be done at two levels.
The ¿rst is to consider the relation between aggregate shocks and restructuring activities, and
analyze how the level and pace of the restructuring activities vary over the business cycle.
This is an area of increasing interest in the empirical analysis of the business cycle (Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1996 Campbell and Kuttner, 1996 Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger, 1997).34
While the model does have distinctive restrictions, such as the ampli¿cation of shocks and the
age composition of exit over the cycle, some of its predictions would be shared by a traditional
Ss model without learning. A direct test of the learning mechanism is then warranted. This is
a challenging task, and the most promising way to tackle it might be to consider case studies
of speci¿c episodes of massive restructuring, such as the one of the US steel industry in the
1981-82 recession as documented by Barnett and Crandall (1986) and popularized by Davis,
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996).$SSHQGL[ ,
3URRIV
I begin with a lemma that will be used to prove proposition 1.
LEMMA 1. Consider two discrete probability functions s and }, with corresponding
cumulative distributions8 andC,d e ¿ ned over a common support f ' i%c% 2cc% ?j,w h e r e
%  	% 2	  	% ? . Assume that there exists an 7 = such that sE% :} E %  for 	7 = ,a n d
s E % 	} E % for :7 = . Then, ;  	 ?c 8E% :C E %  .










  8E% 	   CE%. Finally, for  '7 = ,i fs E % 7 = 9 '} E % 7 =  , the same argument can be
extended to such a point, while if sE%7 ='} E % 7 =  , then, given that 8E%7 =3 :C E % 7 = 3   ,i t
follows that 8E%7 ='8E % 7 = 3 nsE % 7 =:C E % 7 = 3 n}E % 7 ='C E % 7 = .
P ROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. If bEr :b ffor r ' i?c_j, then all units will stay at least one
period, so that each of them receives a signal. Consider now a generic period :fbefore
which no voluntary exit has taken place. Given the continuum of units assumption, there will
be a non-zero mass of units that will have received all possible combinations of signals. For
Bayesian updating, we only need the total number of bad and good signals, given that the order
inwhichtheyarereceiveddoesnotmatter. Therewillbenpointsforbeliefswithanon-zero
mass of units, corresponding to having received fccc bad signals out of  total signals. For
?K bad signals, the value of the posterior isbE?K  bE?Kc? K(b fas calculated according to
Bayes rule in (2). Clearly, in any period c bEf 	b f	b E  .D e ¿ ne sE?Kmw as the discrete
density function of the VKDUH of units at belief bE?K,a n d8 E ? Km w as the cumulative density
function. Then, we want to show that ; ?K 	? c8 E ? K m w  :8 E b ? Km w , .I ft h i si st h ec a s e ,
the mass of units at or above a given beliefs level will be different for the two types, which is
enough to prove the proposition. To ease notation, de¿ne R  Pri5Kmwj and R,  Pri5Kmw,j.
Given that there is a continuum of units, the share of units with belief bE?K is the probability36
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This implies that _,sE?K is monotonically decreasing in ?K, from which it follows that
sE?Kmw and sE?Kmw, satisfy the condition of lemma 1, so that 8E?Kmw :8  E ? K m w , 
;b	b . Finally, given that bEf 	b f	b E r  cr ' i ?c_j, it follows that ; :f ,
there is a non-zero mass of units below the exit cutoff, which excludes the possibility that the
full mass of units undertake exit simultaneously.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. I show that any best response strategy is a cutoff strategy.
Consider  oEbcr as de¿ned in equation (14). First, note that the assumption that it is optimal
for a w, unit to leave the market implies that ZEw,cr	EqEB&, which in turn implies
that  oEcr'Z E w , crqE  B&	 & . Second, given that it is optimal for a w unit to
stay, we have  oEfcr' E r : & . If we show that  oEbcr is monotonically decreasing and
continuous in b, then there exists a 7 bEr such that:
oE7 bcr' o E 7 bcr (4A)37
and
oEbcr :  oEbcr ; b:7 b (5A)
From equation (63) it is immediate that ZEbcr is continuous and decreasing in b. Moreover,
given that Er : & for r ' i?c_j and that
S
r Ercr' , it follows that T Er : &,
which implies that the second term on the right hand side of (14) is decreasing and continuous.
Therefore, for all b:7 bit is optimal to exit even if the type will be revealed next period. This
means that the best response is in cutoff strategies. Given that, under the condition discussed
above, cutoff strategies are type revealing, the equilibrium must be in cutoff strategies.
The proof of proposition 3 will follow immediately from this rather obvious lemma.
To ease notation, de¿ne @  E?m? and K  E_m_. Note that E_m?'  @and
E?m_'K .
L EMMA 2. The value of being a w type is higher in a normal period than in a downturn:
E? : E _  .
P ROOF. First, note that iE?cE_jmust satisfy the following system of equations:
E?'Z E w c?nqE  Bd@E?nE @  E _ o (6Aa)
E_'Z E w c_nqE  BdE  KE?nKE_o (6Ab)
Solving this system, the implied values for E?cE_are:
E?'
E  KqE  BZEwc?nE @  qE  BZEwc_
E  @qE  BE  KqE  B  E  @E  KEqE  B2 (7Aa)
E_'
E  @qE  BZEwc_nE K  qE  BZEwc?
E  @qE  BE  KqE  B  E  @E  KEqE  B2 (7Ab)
Then, given that Ermr 5 Efc ;rcr,a n dt h a tq E  B 	 , the denominator of
the expression is positive. Comparing the numerators, after collecting terms we obtain that
E? : E _ i fa n do n l yi fd Z E w  c?ZEw c_oE  qE  B : f, or equivalently if
ZEwc?:Z E w c_.38





_jas obtained in equation (16). First, note that given the assumption that E?m? :
E?m_ and the result established in lemma 2, it is immediate to show that T E? :TE _  ,w i t h
TE r de¿ned in equation (13). In addition, I have shown thatZEbc_ 	Z E bc?,s ot h a t
 o E bc? :  oEbc_ ;b 5 dfco (8A)
Consider than b
W
_.G i v e nw h a te s t a b l i s h e di ne q u a t i o n( 8 A ) ,a n dg i v e nt h a t o E b
W










([LVWHQFH GLVFXVVLRQ DQG QRGHYLDWLRQ FRQGLWLRQ
Intermsofexistence, thenumericalsolutionofthemodelshowsthatitisindeedanissue.
In particular, the cost of exit needs to be relatively large for a pessimistic unit to be willing to
wait for the ¿rst exit times. The problem is particularly severe when# is low, arguably because
in that case, for given \W, a unit needs to wait longer. For higher values of # equilibria exist
for a large selection of parameter values.
The existence issue is a very important problem for the model. However, as already
noted by Caplin and Leahy (1994), it seems more a technical issue than a substantive one.
The problem arises because of the continuum of units assumption, which implies that the
information cannot be realized at any rate other than “all” or “nothing”. With a discrete
number of units, it would be possible to choose (mixed) strategies that control the amount
of information being released and can therefore keep pessimistic units from exiting.
27 While it
would be interesting to pursue a formulation of the model along these lines, there seems to be
no easy way to tackle the problem once we dismiss the continuum of units assumption.
A drastic way to solve the existence issue is to increase the cost of exit in periods when
no other unit voluntarily exits. Formally, if we de¿ne the mass of voluntary exit from the
cohort in period | with e|, then we impose:
&Ee|'

& if e| : f
& otherwise (10A)
This assumption does not modify the previous analysis. Then, for suitable values of &,s u c h
as for all & :Z E w ,c_, it is easy to show that an equilibrium exists.
For the no deviation condition, I only sketch the derivation
28 of the condition for 	 W
_ .
The one for W
_  	 W
?follows the same logic. Consider a generic period f 	 W
_ .
I have argued in the text that we only need to worry about the value of continuing for the
5: Models with a discrete number of agents can be found in Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode (1997) and
Chamley and Gale (1994). Those models are however simpler in that, in addition to not having an aggregate state,
either there is no private information (the former) or there is no arrival of new information over time (the latter).
5; Detailed calculations are available upon request.40
most pessimistic units, that is, for those that have received all bad signals. Therefore, all the
expectations in the following derivation are conditional on current beliefs bf ' bEfcf(b f.
The conditioning is not explicitly reported to ease the notation. By linearity ofZEbcr in b and
by the martingale property of the beliefs, we have:
.EZEbcr ' ZEbfcr (11A)
where b is the belief at .D e ¿ ne the following truncated expectations and probabilities:
b
r










 is the expected value for beliefs at time  conditional on the fact that beliefs are below the
equilibrium threshold, and r
 the probability that beliefs are above the threshold.
De¿ne KErmr as the probability that the ¿rst adjustment takes place at time  in state
r given that the state at f is r. For example, for r ' _cW
_ 		 W
?,w eh a v e :
K E _ m r '  W
_3  fE ? m r   E ? m ? 
3  W
_3  E _ m ?   (14A)
KE_mr is the probability that the ¿rst downturn in the interval dW
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The ¿rst two lines represent the expected payoff from the pre-adjustment periods, the third and
fourth that from the adjustment period with adjustment taking place in a downturn and the last
two that from adjustment taking place in a normal period.5HIHUHQFHV
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